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When international law 
was made in Maine: 
the Gulf ofMaine 
judgm nt 2 
by Charles H. Norchi 
On April r, 1984, readers of the Portland Sunday Telegraph newspaper saw a story tided 
«The Battle for Georges Bank." The article began: «Beginning tomorrow, U.S. and Cana­
dian lawyers will present their cases to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, 
the Netherlands .... The courr>s decision will be binding and cannot be appealed." 
KEY MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN TEAM WAS MAINE 
a>vyer Ralph Lancaster, who said, "Never before has 
ny court been asked to locate a single boundary line 
which will fix-for all time-the rights of countries in both 
the seabed and the water column. The lives of hundreds, if 
not thousands, of fishermen and the fishing industry itself 
will be substantially affected." The high stakes implicated 
fishing, petroleum and mineral resource rights of Canada and 
the United States. The battle would culminate before a World 
Court established by member governments of the United 
Nations. This past October marked the twenty-fifth anniver­
sary ofthe decision known as the Case Concerning Delimitation 
ofthe Maritime Boundary in the GulfofMaine Area (Canada/ 
United States ofAmerica) rendered byThe International Court 
ofJustice. The judgment fixed a maritime boundary that had 
been in question since the American war of independence. On 
this occasion, international law was created in Maine-and in 
significant measure by lawyers from Maine. 
The judgment has continuing impact upon marine and 
mineral resources of Maine, the Canadian maritime prov­
inces, ocean jurisdiction of the United States and Canada, and 
the evolution of international maritime boundary law. The 
boundary as determined by the Chamber awarded roughly 
two-thirds of the Gulf of Maine and nearly three quarters of 
Georges Bank to the United States, with Canada receiving the 
remainder. 
In a public service tradition, Maine-connected lawyers 
contributed greatly to the American effort and to the resulting 
decision. Davis R. Robinson, a Maine resident, was legal 
adviser to the Department ofState and was the agent for the 
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United States. Portland lawyer Ralph I. Lancaster, a Pierce 
Atwood partner, was the special counsel for the United States. 
University of Maine School of Law alumnus Ralph J. Gillis 
was an attorney-advisor to the United States team. 
Lancaster became involved in the case in March 1979, spent 
six weeks during 1983 at The Hague for oral arguments, and 
presented an expert witness to the Chamber, which is extremely 
rare in the World Court. Afterwards in the Portland Sunday 
Telegraph of April I, 1984, Lancaster said, "It's consumed a 
substantial amount of my working and some of my sleeping 
hours just because of the volumes of information. In a January 
12, 1985 interview in the Maine Lawyers Review he further 
observed that "It was an extraordinary experience and, profes­
sionally, probably the highlight of my career." He noted an 
additional benefit from his World Court litigation experience: "I 
now know more about fish than I ever wanted to know." 
Prelude to a judgment 
THE INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JusTICE IS A CRITICAL FORUM 
for resolving national maritime boundary delimitation claims. 
However, proceedings of the Court are merely one phase in the 
assertion ofstate competence over authority and control ofocean 
zones that are ultimately clarified in a formal delimitation judg­
ment. The process begins with events, incidents, and coastal state 
demands that are a prelude to international litigation. 
Following intense Canadian and American ocean claims 
in the Gulf of Maine area, the two governments resorted to 
the International Court of Justice. The delimitation issue lay 
dormant until the 1960s when the United States and Canada 
were exploring for hydrocarbon resources in the northwest 
Atlantic. As the Court noted, 
This dispute first developed in relation to the conti­
nental shelf of what is now the delimitation area, and 
did so as soon as exploration for hydrocarbon resources 
was begun on each side, particularly in the subsoil of 
certain parts of Georges Bank. Exploration for hydro­
carbon resources of the continental shelf in the Gulf 
of Maine area began in the 1960s.... In 1953, the 
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United States had enacted the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act, the primary text governing activi­
ties on its continental shelf, but because the status of 
Georges Bank as the principal fishing bank on the East 
Coast raised important environmental concerns, explo­
ration proceeded slowly and development has been 
deferred. The first United States permits for geophys­
ical exploration in this area were issued in 1964. On 
the Canadian side, the first regulations authorizing oil 
and gas operations in off-shore areas were issued in 
1960 (Canada Oil and Gas Regulations), and in 1964 
the Canadian Government began to issue exploration 
permits in the Gulf of Maine area. Canada has made 
it clear that when issuing such permits, in the absence 
of any delimitation of the continental shelf agreed with 
the United States, it treated the equidistance line as a 
working boundary, drawing its inspiration from Article 
6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, at 
least to the extent of including, in any permits issued 
extending to areas beyond that line, a caveat to the 
effect that the permit was issued "subject to the lands 
contained in the grid areas being Canadian lands."1 
By 1969, the boundary of the continental shelf in the 
area emerged as an official issue during diplomatic talks and 
hence formal negotiations between the two states proceeded 
throughout the 1970s.2 Over that decade, the two countries 
remained in disagreement over the continental shelf and 
the fishery resources of the Georges Bank, one of the richest 
fishing grounds on the planet and holding potentially valuable 
oil and gas reserves. 3 The United States and Canada continued 
to assert overlapping claims to the continental shelf and super­
jacent waters of the Gulf of Maine seaward from the coast 
to a distance of two hundred nautical miles.4 On March 29, 
1979, the two governments concluded a Treaty to Submit to 
Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area5 
The International Court of justice: Some Background 
The International Court of Justice was established by the 
United Nations and is the successor to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, which operated under the League of 
Nations until that organization's demise. The Court sits at 
the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. It is composed 
of fifteen judges who are elected to nine-year terms of office 
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by both the United Nations General Assembly and the U.N. 
Security Council, and are drawn from the principal legal 
systems of the world. The Court may not include more than 
one citizen of the same state. 
Only nations appear before the Court in contentious cases. 
The Court can also render advisory opinions on legal ques­
tions at the request of the administrative organs of the United 
Nations or its specialized agencies that are authorized by 
charter to put questions of international law before the Court. 
The statute ofthe Court lists these sources of international law 
to be applied to disputes: international treaties and conven­
tions in force; international customary law; general principles 
of law; and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists. If the parties agree and stipulate, 
the Court can decide a case ex aequo et bono, without limiting 
itself to existing rules of international law. 
The Court typically discharges its duties as a full court of 
fifteen judges. However, at the request of the parties, it may 
establish ad hoc chambers to examine specific cases. The Inter­
national Court ofJustice Statute provides that "[T]he Court 
may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular 
case. The number of judges to constitute such a chamber shall 
be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties."6 
The Gulf of Maine Case was argued to a chamber of five 
judges. Four were selected from the bench and an additional 
ad hoc judge (Cohen) was chosen by Canada. The American 
judge was Steven M. Schwebel. 
The jurisdiction of the Court is by the consensus of the 
parties appearing before it. Jurisdiction can be invoked (1) 
by a joint special agreement (also known as a compromis) to 
submit the dispute to the Court, (2) through a jurisdictional 
clause within a treaty providing that in the event of a dispute 
one of the two states may refer the matter to the International 
Court ofJustice, (3) through a reciprocal declaration made by 
each state whereby the jurisdiction of the Court is accepted as 
compulsory? Contentious case proceedings are often initiated 
through a bilateral special agreement lodged with the Court 
by either of the states parties to the proceedings. The special 
agreement indicates the subject of the dispute and the parties 
thereto.8 1he GulfofMaine (Canada/United States) case was initi­
ated by special agreement annexed to a bilateral treatl 
Nations appearing before the Court are represented by an 
agent, who functions similar to an attorney in a domestic court, 
with an enormous difference: he or she possesses the diplomatic 
power to commit a sovereign state. In the public hearings, the 
agent opens the argu­
ment on behalf of 
the government and 
places written submis­
sions before the Court. 
Agents are assisted 
by co-agents, deputy 
agents or assistant 
agents and counsel who 
prepare briefs (called 
memorials), replies, 
counter-memorials, 
and exhibits. Counsel 
typically deliver oral 
a~gument and examine witnesses. States are often represented 
by extensive teams of lawyers and technical experts. There is 
no specialized International Court ofJustice Bar and hence no 
conditions to be met for counsel and/or advocates to appear 
before the Court other than being appointed by a government. 
The Judgment 
THE SPECIAL AGREEMENT ANNEXED TO THE TREATY 
submitting the boundary question to the Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice requested the Chamber to 
decide "in accordance with the principles and rules of inter­
national law ... the course of the single maritime boundary 
that divides the continental shelf and fisheries zones of the 
United States and Canada"!0 The parties fixed the starting 
point of the delimitation at 44° n' 12" north and 67° 16' 46" 
west, which was the first point ofintersection ofthe two lines 
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at the limits of fishing zones claimed by Canada and the 
United States when the countries decided upon the extension 
of their fishing jurisdictions to two hundred miles. 
Notably, the starting point was not the international 
boundary terminus that was fixed in Grand Manan 
Channel by a February 24, 1925 treaty between the two 
nations, because sovereignty over Machias Seal Island and 
North Rock was in dispute and are seaward of the 1925 
terminus.11 This remains an unresolved matter between 
the United States and Canada. Thus, seaward of Machias 
Seal Island, the parties asked the Chamber to describe the 
course of the maritime boundary in terms of geodetic lines 
and to depict the course of the boundary on hydrographic 
charts.12 
The Gulf of Maine case would be noteworthy for many 
reasons. The Court underscored one in particular: "[T]he ... 
aspect which distinguishes this case from all those previously 
adjudicated is the fact that, for the first time, the delimitation 
which the Chamber is asked to effect does not relate exclu­
sively to the continental shelf, but to both the continental 
shelfand the exclusive fishing zone, the delimitation to be by a 
single boundary ... that the single boundary line to be drawn 
should be applicable to all aspects of the jurisdiction of the 
coastal state, not only jurisdiction as defined by international 
law in its present state, but also as it will be defined in the 
future."13 It was also the first international maritime boundary 
case to reach the Court since the 1982 United Nations Conven­
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),14 which provided a 
vague formulation for delimiting the maritime boundaries 
between states' exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and conti­
nental shelves: 
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/ 
continental shelf between states with opposite or adja­
cent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the 
basis of international law, as referred to in Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.15 
However, the Convention was not in force as between 
the Canada and the United States. Although it was the 
paramount international legal instrument for the oceans, it 
provided minimal guidance for maritime boundary delimi­
tation. Therefore, this area of law has developed through 
International Court of Justice decisions and judgments of 
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Delimitation lines proposed by the parties before the Chamber. 
other international tribunals. As the Court in the Libya-Malta 
case observed, "The Convention sets a goal to be achieved, 
but is silent as to the method to be followed to achieve it. It 
restricts itself to setting a standard, and it is left to the states 
themselves, or to the courts, to endow this standard with 
.fi ,16
speCI c content. 
Neither of the principal conventions could be applied by 
the Court to these parties in this dispute. Thus, the Chamber 
primarily relied upon customary international law, which 
provided only a few basic legal principles as guidelines to be 
followed. A key objective was to achieve an equitable result. 
The problem of a single maritime boundary for multiple ocean 
zones was new, and practice was sparse and was driven by the 
special characteristics of each case. 17 The Chamber would 
break new ground in international law. 
The parties agreed upon a fundamental norm applicable 
to the delimitation of a single maritime boundary: that the 
delimitation must be effected in accordance with equitable 
principles accounting for all relevant circumstances to achieve 
an equitable result.18 The Chamber further clarified this by 
declaring that the fundamental norm required that all mari­
time boundary delimitations, whether through negotiation or 
dispute resolution, must be achieved "by the application of 
equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable 
of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration 
of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable 
result."19 This was the ratio decidendi of the decision and its 
purpose was to serve as a guideline to achieve a goal. "In a 
matter of this kind, international law-and in this respect the 
Chamber has logically to refer primarily to customary inter­
national law- and of its nature only provide a few basic legal 
principles, which lay down guidelines with a view to an essen­
tial objective."20 
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The Chamber drew a distinction between principles and 
rules of international law, and the criteria and methods for 
their application. The Chamber was contextual in its approach, 
observing that cases are "monotypic and that, more often than 
not, the most appropriate criteria, and the method or combi­
nation of methods most likely to yield a result consonant with 
what the law indicates, can only be determined in relation 
to each particular case and its specific characteristics."21 The 
critical decision tools were the "various equitable criteria and 
practical methods that may be used to ensure in concreto that 
a particular situation is dealt with in accordance with the prin­
. I d I · · "22ctp es an rues m question. 
This method "is inspired by and derives from a particular 
equitable criterion: namely, that the equitable solution, at least 
prima facie, is an equal division of the areas of overlap of the 
continental shelves of the two litigant states,''2~ the Chamber 
noted. However, the applicability of the method would be 
subject to the condition that no special circumstances in this 
context would make that criterion inequitable. Any method 
that produced a prima facie unreasonable boundary result 
would be followed by an appropriate correction consonant with 
principles of international law. Significantly, the Chamber did 
not select a basic method that would apply in single maritime 
boundary delimitations. While indicating that pure geometric 
methods of equidistance could be used where geographically 
appropriate, it refused to elevate the equidistance method to a 
rule of customary law.Z4 No fundamental method of delimita­
tion was urged. The equitable criteria clarified in the context of 
delimitating a single maritime boundary would determine the 
method or methods of implementation. Thus, "methods must 
be chosen which are instruments suitable for giving effect 
to those criteria and not other criteria of a fundamentally 
different kind."25 
The elementsofchoice-makingadoptedbytheChamber were 
a departure from established criteria and a methodological 
shift. Producing a single line for both the continental shelf 
and the superjacent water column, the Chamber noted that 
this "can only be produced by the application of a criterion, 
or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential 
treatment to one of these two objects to the detriment of the 
other and at the same 
time is such as to be 
equally suitable to the 
division of either of 
them."26 The United 
States urged the 
Chamber to consider 
the macrogeograph­
ical context of the 
Gulf of Maine on 
the North American 
east coast.Z7 Canada 
pressed the Chamber 
to consider the Gulf 
as a discrete feature rather than as one feature of a coastline 
of more than one thousand miles.Z8 The Tribunal looked to 
criteria of a "neutral character" derived from the geography of 
coasts within the delimitation area. Hence: 
Basic choice should favour a criterion long held 

to be as equitable as it is simple, namely that in 

principle, while having regard to the special circum­

stances of the case, one should aim at an equal 

division of areas where the maritime projections 

of the coasts of the states between which delimi­

tation is to be effected converge and overlap.29 

Given the array of diverse delimitation claims and cases, 
basic criteria would have to be adjusted, owing to the 
geographic diversity of the world's coasts. Geography became 
the critical conditioning factor and overtook the earlier criterion 
of natural prolongation: 
The Chamber is, furthermore, convinced 

for the purposes of such a delimitation opera­

tion as is here required, international law, as 
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will be shown below, does no more than lay 
down in general that equitable criteria are to be 
applied, criteria which are what may be properly 
called the geographical features of the area. 30 
The Chamber proceeded to draw a single maritime 
boundary in three segments. The first segment was drawn 
using a pure geometrical method and delimited the innermost 
area of the Gulf of Maine. There were no special circum­
stances that required modification. The second segment was 
determined in two stages owing to the presence of special 
circumstances. The configuration of the coasts determined 
the choice of method. At the closing of the Gulf, the coasts 
of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia face each other and are 
nearly parallel. The Chamber found the relevant coastline 
of the United States to be much longer than that of Canada, 
and this auxiliary criterion of proportionality was taken into 
account. A difference in coastline ratios favoring the United 
States resulted in the provisional median line being moved 
closer to Nova Scotia. A subsequent adjustment in favor of 
Canada was made by giving "half effect" to Seal Island off 
the Nova Scotia coast. The third and final segment would 
determine outcomes pertaining to control of the Georges 
Bank resources. The Chamber was guided by geography­
that is, the orientation of the coasts of the parties abutting on 
the Gulf of Maine. A perpendicular line was drawn from the 
point where the corrected median line reached the closing 
line of the Gulf. 
The prize was the continental shelf and the superjacent 
water column of Georges Bank. It was the geographic config­
uration of the coasts that determined the boundary within 
the Gulf and the boundary course outside the Gulf of Maine. 
The Chamber noted: 
It would be unthinkable that, in that part of 

the delimitation area which lies outside and over 

against the Gulf, the dividing line should not 

follow or continue the line drawn within the Gulf 

by reference to the particular characteristics of its 

coasts. If one were to seek for a typical illustration 

of what is meant by the adage 'the land domi­

nates the sea,' it is here that it would be found.31 

The Chamber underscored that the concept of adjacency, 
or distance, better conveyed the nexus between a state's sover­
eignty and its sovereign rights over adjacent submerged land 
such as the continental shelf and superjacent water column, 
than did the previously accepted idea of natural prolonga­
tion.32 Geography was the primal factor conveying legal title. 
The Chamber stated that: 
"legal title" to certain maritime or submarine areas 

is always and exclusively the effect of a legal opera­

tion. The same is true of the boundary of the extent 

of the title. That boundary results from a rule of law, 

and not from any extrinsic merit in the purely phys­

ical fact. In the Chamber's opinion, it is therefore 

correct to say that international law confers on the 

coastal state a legal title to an adjacent continental 

shelf or to a maritime zone adjacent to its coasts; it 

would not be correct to say that international law 

recognizes the title confirred on the state by the adja­

cency of that shelf or that zone, as if the mere natural 

fact of adjacency produced legal consequences.33 

Legal entitlement to ocean space turns on legal title to 
land. The equitable result that was the goal ofthe fundamental 
norm was achieved by "taking into consideration for each 
party, the extent of the link between the land and the waters, 
the coastal state's right and the equitable limit of its claim 
being a function of the land factor."34 Maritime boundary 
delimitation theory and practice must now account for the 
application of geographic criteria and methods that clearly 
link the land and the sea. 
In future delimitations, the tribunal will initially iden­
tify the area in which the delimitation is to take place and 
the geographical features within that area that will affect the 
projected boundary outcome.35 After identifying the relevant 
area, a tribunal must assess the features in the area and any 
effect that might bear upon delimitation. Because the land 
dominates the sea, the technique of choice has been the equi­
distance line. However, an equidistance line can result in 
distortions and inequitable outcomes. 
The Chamber articulated a guideline for geographic features: 
equitable and geographic factors will be critical conditioning 
factors in ensuring that the outcome is indeed equitable. The 
Gulf of Maine Case Chamber favored geography over other 
factors, including economic factors.36 The significance of 
economic activity to boundary delimitation was treated by 
the Chamber: 
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It is, therefore, in the Chamber's 
view, evident that the respective scale 
of activities connected with fishing­
or navigation, defence or, for that 
matter, petroleum exploration and 
exploitation-cannot be taken into 
account as a relevant circumstance 
or, if the term is preferred, as an 
equitable criterion to be applied in 
determining the delimitation line. 
What the Chamber would regard 
as a legitimate scruple lies rather in 
concern lest the overall result, even 
though achieved through the appli­
cation ofequitable criteria and the 
use ofappropriate methods for giving 
them concrete effect, should unex­
pectedly be revealed as radically 
inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic 
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well­
being of the population of the countries concerned.37 
The key was the nature of the result. To achieve that 
outcome, the Chamber adopted as its departure, a rule of 
general international law that required that the delimitation 
line be established while applying equitable criteria to that 
operation, with a view to reaching an equitable result.38 The 
predominant parameters were provided by the physical and 
political geography of the area and they guided the Chamber 
in its decision.39 
The Enduring Gulf of Maine Legacy 
THE DELIMITATION OF MARJT!ME BoUNDARY IN GULF OF 
Maine Area (Canada/United States/0 was the first inter­
national maritime boundary case to be decided after the 
adoption of the 19&2 Law of the Sea Convention. The Cham­
ber's legal framework identified and clarified an equitable 
result as the delimitation goal, and stipulated that relevant 
circumstances would be factored into achieving that result. 
The decision was criticized, including by the dissenting Judge 
Gros, who wrote, "[W]hat is today called equitable ... is no 
longer a decision based on law but an appraisal of the expedi­
ency of a result, which is the very definition of the arbitrary, 
if no element of control is conceivable."41 
However, this writer joins others who find the decision 
grounded in law and equity42 consistent with interna­
tional maritime boundary law. As scholars have noted, "the 
legal standards applied by the Chamber, while leaving 
certain latitude of the exercise of judgment, are as objec­
tive as possible under the circumstances ... the Chamber's 
focus on geographical factors was correct."43 This was the 
first decision of the Court concerning the delimitation of 
a single maritime boundary for both the continental shelf 
and the superjacent water column.44 Policy professionals, 
practitioners and scholars continue to mine its bearing on 
contemporary delimitation practice.45 
From that first major international maritime boundary 
delimitation post-UNCLOS, more than a dozen cases have 
considered its principles to apply to maritime delimitation. 
The GulfofMaine judgment continues to influence maritime 
delimitation practice and decisions of international tribunals. 
Post-GulfofMaine tribunals have tested equidistance lines to 
determine whether they produce equitable outcomes or should 
be adjusted equity for special circumstances.46 The use of 
equidistance is not mandated, although the equidistance line 
is a useful preliminary analytical step. Following an exami­
nation of the coastlines of the respective parties, a Tribunal 
will adjust the line. A fully equitable delimitation will require 
consideration of coastal proportionality and the relevant 
lengths of parties' coastlines will be examined to assure that 
the ratio is comparable to that ofa delimited maritime space. 
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The older international boundary delimitation norm of 
natural prolongation has been terminated; adjacent islands are 
considered minor factors and will not generate maritime zones 
when situated opposite major land masses or larger islands.47 
The GulfofMaine judgment is a continuingly relevant optic, 
having shaped subsequent claims for the use and exercise of 
coastal state authority over ocean zones. More than twenty­
five years later, the judgment generates a distinctive prism for 
contemporary maritime boundary delimitations and occupies 
a critical position in evolving maritime delimitation case law. 
As the late Professor Jonathan Charney observed: 
The message of the Court is clear. It does not 
hold out the possibility that a clearly determina­
tive black-letter rule of law will be established. Nor 
should the maritime boundary law devolve to the 
point where it is so indeterminate that each delimi­
tation is decided on an ad hoc basis comparable to a 
decision ex aequo et bono. Rather, in the common-law 
tradition as understood by the realists, the continuing 
series of judgments and awards should progressively 
refine the legal rules and their objectives. Over time, 
the essential normative objectives of this law may be 
better understood, notwithstanding the fact that they 
may not be adequately captured in a codification.48 
The emerging International Court of Justice functional 
delimitation approach-in which the law is continually 
refined-is, in large measure, the jurisprudential legacy of the 
case. The Gulf ofMaine judgment has been pivotal in the 
further clarification of delimitation goals, the specification of 
standards, and the evolution of international maritime law. 
Governments and many other entities assert multiple claims to 
the seas implicating the ocean jurisdiction of states. With 
respect to Canadian and American claims, the GulfofMaine 
Chamber clarified the equitable outcome goal as a funda­
mental norm, examined trends in coastal state demands, 
considered the relevant circumstances as the conditions that 
would shape those demands, and carefully appraised delimita­
tion claims ofeach party against a range of future projections. 
The resulting delimitation decision was the culmination of a 
complex process whose outcome implicated the power, wealth 
and well-being of two coastal nations. & 
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